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In re Mosley, 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 94 (2004)1
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE- EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS, MISUSE OF
JUDICIAL LETTERHEAD, AND FAILURE TO RECUSE IN A TIMELY
MANNER
Summary
This case is an appeal of the evidentiary findings of the Nevada Commission on Judicial
Discipline (Commission) on eleven different counts of an official complaint filed by a special
prosecutor against the Honorable Donald M. Mosley (Judge Mosley). The complaint listed
eleven inappropriate actions Judge Mosley allegedly committed from August of 1997 through
August 1999. The counts alleged that Judge Mosley:
Count I- Wrote a personal letter on official judicial letterhead to the
principal of his son’s school in August 1999;
Count II- Wrote a personal letter on official judicial letterhead to the
principal of his son’s school in February 1998;
Count III- Engaged in an ex parte conversation with friend Barbara Orcutt,
regarding the arrest and release of Robert D’Amore in August 1999;
Count IV- Ordered the release of Robert D’Amore on his own
recognizance, without notifying the district attorney’s office, after the
police arrested D’Amore on a bench warrant issued by a different district
court judge in August 1999;
Count V- Engaged in an ex parte telephone conversation with Catherine
Woolf, an attorney representing Joseph McLaughlin in a criminal case that
was assigned to Judge Mosley’s chambers;
Count VI- Engaged in an ex parte conversation in his chambers with
attorney Woolf in August 1997;
Count VII- Engaged in an ex parte conversation with Woolf, McLaughlin
and McLaughlin’s wife in August 1997;
Count VIII- Failed to recuse himself from McLaughlin’s criminal case
until after Mrs. McLaughlin had testified in Judge Mosley’s custody case;
Count IX- Communicated with McLaughlin’s wife regarding
McLaughlin’s incarceration;
Count X- Assisted McLaughlin’s wife in obtaining the return of her
vehicle;
Count XI- Continued to communicate with McLaughlin and his wife after
recusing himself in McLaughlin’s criminal case, the continued
communication creating an appearance that Judge Mosley was rewarding
the McLaughlins for assisting him in his custody dispute.
After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the Commission concluded that Judge Mosley
committed the violations admitted in Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, and VIII, and dismissed
Counts V, IX, X, and XI. Judge Mosley was ordered to attend the first general ethics course at
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the National Judicial College at his own expense, to pay a $5,000 fine and to receive strongly
worded censures for violating ethics rules. Judge Mosley appealed the findings on the grounds
that there was insufficient evidence to support the Commission’s findings and that the
Commission erred in other respects.
Chief Justice Miriam Shearing, writing for the majority, cited Goldman v. Nevada
Commission on Judicial Discipline2 and held that the findings of the Commission were not
subject to de novo review. The Court held that Goldman limited the scope of appellate review of
the Commission’s decision to whether the Commission’s findings were supported by clear and
convincing evidence.3
Counts I & II: Use of judicial letterhead
The circumstances surrounding the misuse of judicial letterhead stems from the bitter
custody dispute between Judge Mosley and his ex-girlfriend Terry Mosley (aka Figliuzzi), over
their son Michael. After Judge Mosley was issued custody of Michael, he wrote two letters to
Michael’s school on official Eighth Judicial District Court letterhead. The letters asked that the
school prohibit Figliuzzi from visiting Michael at school.
The Commission found that Judge Mosley violated NCJC Canon 2B which states in
pertinent part:
A judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships
to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall
not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests
of the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence
the judge.
Subsequently, the court adopted the objective reasonable person standard for interpreting
judicial canons and held that there was clear and convincing evidence that an objective
reasonable person could conclude that Judge Mosley wrote the letters on official letterhead to
obtain a personal advantage in violation of NCJC Canon 2B.
Counts III & IV: Ex parte communications and own recognizance release
The facts surrounding these counts stem from the communications surrounding, and
subsequent release of, a Robert D’Amore. D’Amore had been arrested for a burglary and
eventually pled to an attempted theft. As a requirement of the plea D’Amore was to make
restitution payments of $10,000 a month. When D’Amore failed to attend required court hearings
and pay his court-ordered restitution, a bench warrant was issued and D’Amore was arrested.
D’Amore’s former employer Barbara Orcutt, a friend of Judge Mosley, called and asked
Judge Mosley to release D’Amore on his own recognizance (OR). Judge Mosley then called
Judge John McGroarty, who was presiding over D’Amore’s case and asked Judge McGroarty if
he minded if Judge Mosley issued a OR release for D’Amore. It was uncontested that Judge
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Mosley had the power to order the OR release; however, Judge McGroarty testified that no judge
of an equal jurisdiction had ever previously overridden one of his bench warrants.
Judge Mosley also issued the OR release without informing the District Attorney (DA)
assigned to the case. At the hearing the DA testified that she would have opposed the OR if she
had been contacted. The Commission found that Judge Mosley violated NCJC Canons 1,4 2, 5 2A
and 3B(7)6 by engaging in an ex parte communication with Orcutt regarding D’Amore’s arrest
and OR release and violated NCJC Canons 1, 2, 2A and 2B by ordering the release of D’Amore
on OR at Orcutt’s request, without notifying the DA’s office.
However, the court reversed the Commission’s findings on Count III & IV because of
special circumstances surrounding the communication and release. Apparently, the practice in
Nevada prior to the enacting of Rule 3.80 of the Rules of Practice of the Eighth Judicial Court,7
was to allow ex parte communications and OR release requests by a judge’s family, friends, and
other members of the law enforcement community. Since the local district attorneys had
acquiesced to this practice for over thirty years, the court could not support the Commission’s
holdings despite its comport with the letter of the law.
Counts VI, VII, and VIII: Ex parte communication and delayed recusal
The factual basis behind Counts VI, VII, and VIII again relate to Judge Mosley’s custody
battle for Michael. Joseph McLaughlin was charged with kidnapping, robbery with use of a
weapon, and cheating at gambling. Attorney Catherine Woolf represented Mr. McLaughlin on
these charges. Prior to trial Mr. McLaughlin entered into plea negotiations where he pleaded
guilty to robbery without the use of a weapon in exchange for the dropping of the kidnap charge
and agreeing to testify against hi co-defendant. In July 1997, McLaughlin’s case was transferred
to Judge Mosley’s courtroom.
Woolf soon learned that Figliuzzi, the mother of Judge Mosley’s son Michael was living
with the McLaughlin’s and that Mr. McLaughlin had concerns for how Figliuzzi was caring for
Michael at this time. At this point, McLaughlin was allegedly unaware that his case had been
reassigned to Judge Mosley. Woolf then told McLaughlin that if he testified for Judge Mosley in
his custody matter Judge Mosley would have to recuse himself form his criminal case and that
would be to his benefit since Judge Mosley had a reputation for giving harsh sentences.
Woolf subsequently had an ex parte meeting with Judge Mosley in chambers where she
informed Judge Mosley of McLaughlin’s case status before him and the information he had
about Figliuzzi and Michael. Woolf then testified that Judge Mosley asked her to meet with
4
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Judge Mosley’s attorney Carl Lovell. Woolf stated that Judge Mosley never indicated at that
meeting that he was planning to recuse himself from McLaughlin’s criminal case.
A second meeting took place with Judge Mosley, attorneys Lovell and Woolf,
McLaughlin and McLaughlin’s wife. Woolf again mentioned that Judge Mosley was assigned to
McLaughlin’s criminal case. Lovell testified that this was the first time that he had heard of this
potential conflict. Both McLaughlin and his wife signed affidavits for Judge Mosley to use in his
custody case.
Subsequently, according to Woolf’s testimony, the McLaughlins testified in Judge
Mosley’s behalf at the custody hearing on October 10, 1997. Woolf stated that at the time of the
McLaughlins’ testimony she had not received notification that Judge Mosley had recused himself
from the McLaughlin’s criminal case. It was later established that Judge Mosley did not recuse
himself until after the custody hearing began. It was also established that this deviated from
Judge Mosley’s normal recusal procedure.
The Commission found that Judge Mosley violated NCJC Canon 3B(7)8 for engaging in
an ex parte meeting with Woolf in his chambers (Count VI) and for meeting with Woolf and the
McLaughlins at Lovell’s office (Count VII) and that he violated NCJC Canons 1, 2, 2A, and 2B9
when he failed to recuse himself until after the McLaughlins had testified (Count VIII) making
Judge Mosley’s decision to recuse appear based solely on the testimony and its content.
Judge Mosley’s arguments against these Counts are weak at best because Woolf’s
testimony shows that substantive issues of McLaughlin’s case were discussed at the meeting so
Count VI easily meets the clear and convincing evidence standard. Also the emergency
exception of NCJC 3B(7)(a)10 does not apply here because a) Judge Mosley had to realize that it
was unlikely for Woolf to approach him with this information for any other reason than a tactical
advantage and more importantly 2) Judge Mosley failed to inform the prosecutor of either of his
meetings with the McLaughlins. The court concluded that all the evidence on these Counts met
the clear and convincing standard.
Expert Witness
Judge Mosley also asserted on appeal that the Commission erred in disallowing the
testimony of his expert witness Professor Jeffrey Stempel, an ethics expert. The Commission
reasoned, per N.R.S. 50.275,11 that it did not need the assistance of Professor Stempel to
determine if Judge Mosley’s acts were unethical. The court held that the Commission did not
abuse its discretion its decision in excluding Judge Mosley’s expert witness. The remainder of
Judge Mosley’s arguments pertaining to alleged due process violations were found without
merit.
8
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Issue and Disposition
Issue
Was there sufficient evidence to support the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline’s
findings that the Honorable Judge Donald Mosley violated various Nevada Code of Judicial
Conduct Canons when he:
Count I- Wrote a personal letter on official judicial letterhead to the
principal of his son’s school in August 1999.
Count II- Wrote a personal letter on official judicial letterhead to the
principal of his son’s school in February 1998.
Count III- Engaged in an ex parte conversation with a friend Barbara
Orcutt, regarding the arrest and release of Robert D’Amore in August
1999.
Count IV- Ordered the release of Robert D’Amore on his own
recognizance, without notifying the district attorney’s office, after the
police arrested D’Amore on a bench warrant issued by a different district
court judge in August 1999.
Count VI- Engaged in an ex parte conversation in his chambers with
attorney Woolf in August 1997.
Count VII- Engaged in an ex parte conversation with Woolf, McLaughlin
and McLaughlin’s wife in August 1997.
Count VIII- Failed to recuse himself from McLaughlin’s criminal case
until after Mrs. McLaughlin had testified in Judge Mosley’s custody case.

Disposition
(Shearing, C.J. and Agosti, J.) Majority opinion Yes as to Counts I, II, VI, VII, and VIII, and
No as to Counts III, and IV. (Counts V, IX, X, and XI were dismissed by the Nevada
Commission on Judicial Discipline above) The majority also upheld the Commission’s
determination of discipline for Judge Mosley including attendance at a general ethics course, a
$5,000 fine, and a strongly worded censure.
(Maupin, J., Becker, J., and Puccinelli, D.J.) Concurring in part, dissenting in part- Yes as
to Counts I, II, VI, VII, VIII and No as to Count III (as majority opinion); however, would also
affirm as to Count IV (dissenting as to majority).
(Rose, J.) Concurring in part, dissenting in part- Concur as to majority opinion except as to
Count VII.
(Gibbons, J.) Dissenting- No as to all counts because failure to allow Judge Mosley’s expert
witness to testify violated his procedural due process rights and constituted an abuse of
discretion. Would reverse the decision and remand the case with instructions to consider Judge
Mosley’s expert’s testimony.

Commentary
State of the Law Before Mosley
Judicial discipline cases in Nevada Prior to Mosley have run the gamut from cases
removing judges from office for willful misconduct12 to a reversal of a public reprimands for a
justice of the peace when he engaged in ex parte communications with a criminal defendant in a
case where he had recused himself.13 However, this area of jurisprudence is growing as rapidly
as the state is. With the increase in population there is a greater need for judges, and in turn, a
greater number of instances where misconduct may occur. The increase in the size of the legal
community also plays a role in the increase in judicial disciplinary hearings based on
mathematics and probability alone.
The growth in the legal community requires that the level of informality that previously
existed the Nevada legal community to cease. For example, communication or acts by legal
professionals that were acceptable twenty years ago are now no longer allowed. The Mosley
Court overturned Count IV above where Judge Mosley provided and OR release for a Robert
D’Amore, an ex-employee of an acquaintance of Judge Mosley’s. While this might have violated
the letter of the law, it was standard practice in Nevada over the past thirty years to allow ex
parte communications and OR releases in this manner. After Mosley it is abundantly clear that
actions like this will not be tolerated. Therefore, Mosley has importance in establishing an
updated ethical framework for judicial acts in Nevada.
Effect of Mosley on Current Law
Mosley presented several issues of first impression to the Nevada Supreme Court. Mosley
stands for the proposition that judicial letterhead may not be used for anything other than official
business, that ex parte communications should not be engaged in lightly even when issues
wholly unrelated with the case at bar occur, and that the previous practice of granting OR
releases to friends and family members of judges cannot stand as common practice. Perhaps
more importantly Mosley exists as a signpost to the Nevada judiciary that the boundaries of what
is acceptable conduct for a judge in Nevada is evolving.
Conclusion
Nevada is growing and evolving as a state. This growth and evolution comes with its own
unique problems for the Nevada judiciary. Things that were perfectly acceptable, even
commonplace, twenty years ago now qualify as acts that open a judge up to potential disciplinary
hearings. The Nevada judiciary must learn to evolve to the current standards of ethical behavior,
and the decision in Mosley helps them to do just that.
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